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In recent years the securitization of loan and bond portfolios became
more and more popular among banks. The volume of collateralized loan
obligations (CLOs) and collateralized bond obligations (CBOs) strongly
increased in the United States and in Europe. This development raises sev-
eral issues at the micro and the macro level. This paper will address some
issues on the micro level, in particular the impact of CLO-transactions on
the banks’ risk taking.
In a CLO-transaction the bank transfers default risks of the underlying
loans to other market participants, the investors. Since the bank usually
has inside information about its borrowers, it has to oﬀer some credit en-
hancements in a CLO-transaction to protect the investors against poten-
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suggestions.tial eﬀects of asymmetric information. For that purpose the bank usually
takes a ﬁrst-loss position in the default risks of the underlying loan portfo-
lio. This raises the question about the eﬀective extent of the risk transfer in
a CLO-transaction. The ﬁrst purpose of this paper is to look into this issue.
Our results show, ﬁrst, that contrary to what many observers believe, the
default losses of the securitized portfolio largely remain on the books of the
issuing bank. Second, in a fully funded transaction, the risk of extreme un-
expected losses—that is, the bad tail risk—is transferred from the bank to
investors. We argue that the combined eﬀect of retaining the ﬁrst-loss piece
and selling senior tranches to investors achieves an eﬃcient risk allocation,
reducing the bank’s exposure to extreme risks that might endanger the
bank’s solvency. Thus, securitization should have a positive impact on the
bank’s solvency.
This direct eﬀect of securitization on the bank’s default risk is derived
from simulations of the loss-rate distribution of the underlying loan port-
folio. This distribution and the ﬁrst-loss position jointly determine the
eventual risk transfer to investors. The loss-rate distribution depends not
only on the average quality of the underlying loans, but also on the corre-
lation of defaults among these loans. Therefore, the correlation impact is
also analyzed in the simulations.
Banks usually securitize loan portfolios not only for their direct eﬀect,
but also to enlarge their investment opportunity set. In a fully funded
transaction, the bank can use the proceeds from issuing securities in vari-
ous ways. The most conservative use would be to reinvest the proceeds in
risk-free assets or to repay some of its own debt. In this case, securitization
would reduce the overall risk of the bank. Alternatively, the bank could ex-
pand its loan business by granting new loans to new customers. Then the
bank would retain the default risk of the ﬁrst-loss position and, in addi-
tion, take the default risks of the new loans. Even though the total loan
portfolio of the bank is now better diversiﬁed, the overall risk of the bank
is likely to be higher than before securitization. We also simulate the eﬀects
of this reinvestment policy, assuming diﬀerent correlations among the loan
defaults. The simulation results indicate that the standard deviation of the
bank’s loan loss rate increases after securitization. Thus, it would be naive
to assume that securitization generally reduces the bank’s risks.
The nature of the bank’s reinvestment policy is an empirical matter.
Therefore, we try to obtain some insight into this question by analyzing the
stock market reaction to securitization. This is the second main purpose of
the paper. The underlying approach is based on the capital asset pricing
model (CAPM). In an event study we look at the abnormal stock returns
of a bank around the announcement date of a securitization, to ﬁnd out
whether the stockholders consider securitization as value enhancing. We
also look at the bank’s beta change around the securitization and try to in-
fer from this change the nature of the bank’s reinvestment policy. Obvi-
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conclusions are preliminary, at best. A more careful analysis needs to look
at the details of the bank’s balance sheets. But this is beyond the scope of
this paper.
We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant abnormal stock returns around the announce-
ment dates. But we ﬁnd signiﬁcant increases in the banks’ stock betas. We
interpret this as evidence that most banks use securitization to take more
systematic risks. Suppose, for example, that banks use the proceeds from
securitization in a fully funded transaction to grant new loans to new cus-
tomers. Then the granularity of the bank’s total loan portfolio should in-
crease, so that the correlation between the bank’s default losses and the
macrofactor of default losses should increase as well. Assuming a strong
correlation between the macrofactor of default losses and the stock market
return and a strong correlation between the bank’s default losses and its
stock return, the correlation between the bank’s stock return and the mar-
ket return should increase. In addition, this reinvestment policy is likely to
raise the standard deviation of the bank’s default losses and, thus, the stan-
dard deviation of the bank’s stock return so that the bank’s beta should
increase.
The ﬁnding that, on average, the banks’ betas increase with securitiza-
tion announcements could be explained not only by taking more system-
atic risks, but also by secular increases of the banks’ betas over the sam-
pling period. However, we control for this possibility. Therefore, we regard
our ﬁnding as preliminary empirical evidence about the banks’ reinvest-
ment policies.
These ﬁndings on the micro level can have important consequences on
the macro level, in particular, on the stability of ﬁnancial markets. We will
comment on these potential eﬀects only brieﬂy in the conclusion.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 13.2, we ﬁrst provide some
institutional background and then analyze the securitization impact on the
default risk of the bank’s loan book. In section 13.3, we look at the stock
market reaction to securitization announcements, including the beta ef-
fects. Section 13.4 concludes.
13.2 Tranching and the Allocation of Risk
In section 13.2.1, the typical securitization contracts are brieﬂy de-
scribed. Moreover, based on a European sample of collateralized debt ob-
ligations (CDOs), some evidence on ﬁrst-loss pieces and tranching is pre-
sented. In section 13.2.2, we describe our method to simulate the default
loss distribution for a given loan portfolio. Section 13.2.3 presents some Eu-
ropean evidence on loss allocation to tranches in CDO-transactions. Sec-
tion 13.2.4 then analyzes the eﬀects on the bank’s default losses of securi-
tization and reinvestment policies.
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There are basically two types of CDO transactions: fully funded asset-
backed securities (ABS) and synthetic transactions. For a detailed descrip-
tion of contract types see Fabozzi et al. (chapters 24 and 25) and Das (2000;
part one). In an ABS transaction the bank sells part of its loan portfolio to
a special purpose vehicle (SPV), which reﬁnances itself through the issue of
bonds. Usually the bank has to take a ﬁrst-loss position; that is, the bank
agrees to absorb default losses up to a speciﬁed limit. To achieve this, the
bank can buy the nonrated tranche (equity tranche), which absorbs all de-
fault losses up to its par value, before other tranches have to bear any fur-
ther losses. In addition, or alternatively, the SPV can set up a reserve ac-
count that builds up over time from excess interest payments, received from
the SPV after it has serviced other investors. The reserve account absorbs
default losses in a similar way. In these transactions, the bank can use the
proceeds from the sale of its loans to generate new business.
In a synthetic CLN (credit linked note) transaction, the bank retains the
loans, but buys protection through a credit default swap with an SPV as the
counterparty. Again, the bank usually takes a ﬁrst-loss position by arrang-
ing the swap so that nothing is paid unless losses on the underlying loan
portfolio exceed a threshold. Moreover, the maximum amount paid by the
swap is often much smaller than the face value of the underlying loan port-
folio. The bank thus retains both a ﬁrst-loss position and the risk associ-
ated with very large losses. The bank may buy protection for these risks
through a senior credit default swap with a diﬀerent counterparty. A syn-
thetic CLN arrangement diﬀers from an ordinary credit default swap ar-
rangement because the SPV’s assets protect the bank against counterparty
risk, may provide more regulatory capital relief, and may permit a wider-
than-usual class of investors to act as protection sellers.
The ﬁrst-loss position is motivated by information asymmetries. These
asymmetries are a major obstacle to trading debt claims, in particular
claims against small obligors about whom little is known publicly (Green-
baum and Thakor 1987). Adverse selection and moral hazard of the bank
create problems similar to those in the insurance business. Therefore, suit-
able mechanisms of protection are also applied in CDO transactions. The
main instruments are ﬁrst-loss positions (deductibles in the case of insur-
ance contracts) and risk-sharing arrangements (coinsurance in the case of
insurance contracts). First-loss positions have been shown to be optimal
arrangements in a number of papers, including Arrow (1971), Townsend
(1979), and Gale and Hellwig (1985). Riddiough (1997) shows that split-
ting (tranching) the portfolio payoﬀ into a risk-free security, which is not
subject to asymmetric information problems and sold to outside investors,
and a risky asset, which may be retained by the bank, is better than having
one type of security only, which is partially sold to outside investors. De-
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risky. In a study on U.S. credit card securitizations, Calomiris and Mason
(2004) argue that even in the absence of a ﬁrst-loss piece retention, implicit
recourse through early amortization may serve the same economic func-
tion, thereby circumventing minimum capital regulation.
Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) propose a partial loan sale to mitigate
moral hazard problems. This is observed in credit card securitizations, for
example, but not in CLO transactions. The reason may be that the origi-
nator is likely to earn a higher fraction of expected monitoring beneﬁts if
he takes a high ﬁrst-loss position instead of retaining a moderate fraction
of all tranches. Thus, investors may believe that a ﬁrst-loss position (FLP)
provides stronger monitoring incentives.
The ﬁrst-loss piece reduces problems of asymmetric information faced by
investors if it is held by the originating bank. In principle, the bank can
transfer the default losses of a ﬁrst-loss piece by buying a credit default swap
or, in the case of an equity tranche, by selling this tranche. Usually banks do
not publish information on this issue. An investigation of the Deutsche
Bundesbank (2004) covering the ten major German banks securitizing loan
portfolios revealed that, on average, they retain not only the ﬁrst-loss piece,
amounting to 2.1 percent of the transaction volume, but in addition also the
lowest-rated tranches, amounting to another 4.9 percent of the transaction
volume. Thus, it appears that the originating banks usually retain the ﬁrst-
loss piece. This would be in line with economic reasoning, since we would
expect very high credit spreads required by investors for taking the default
losses of the ﬁrst-loss piece due to asymmetric information.
The optimal size of the ﬁrst-loss position depends not only on problems
of asymmetric information, but also on various other considerations. A
larger ﬁrst-loss piece reduces the default loss transfer and absorbs more
regulatory as well as economic equity capital, leaving less room for new ac-
tivities of the originating bank. Given the strong skewness of a typical loan
portfolio’s default loss distributions, as illustrated in the next section, we
would expect the ﬁrst-loss piece to clearly exceed the mean default loss.
The importance of default risk for the size of the FLP can be seen from
a sample of forty-three European CLO transactions for which we could get
a standardized measure of portfolio default risk.
This is done by converting Moody’s weighted average rating factor or, if
it is not available, the weighted average quality of the underlying loans into
a weighted average default probability (wadp). We then regress the nomi-
nal size of the ﬁrst-loss piece on the weighted average default probability,
the issue date, and Moody’s diversity score (ds). The latter statistic captures
the diversiﬁcation of the underlying asset portfolio. Its score is increasing
if portfolio loans are spread more evenly within and across industries.
FLP   c    wadp    ds    date   ε
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0.00), while  is negative and weakly signiﬁcant (p 0.07); the adjusted R-
squared is 0.73. The issue date is insigniﬁcant. Thus, the weighted average
default probability is a strong determinant of the size of the FLP, conﬁrm-
ing our conjecture that the ﬁrst loss position increases with the expected
default loss of the underlying portfolio. The protective role of the FLP will
become more apparent when, in the next section, we simulate the loss dis-
tribution of the underlying portfolio, and estimate the share of expected
default losses covered by the FLP.
The shape of the loss distribution is essential for understanding the rel-
evance of the diversity score for the size of the FLP. A large diversity score
is indicative of a steep loss distribution, with loss observations being more
heavily concentrated around the mode.
A common feature of asset securitizations is the allocation of portfolio
risk to several layers of claims. These layered claims, or tranches, obey the
principle of strict subordination. Losses up to the par value of the lowest
tranche are completely absorbed by the holders of this tranche. If accumu-
lated losses of the underlying asset portfolio exceed the par value of the
lowest tranche, which is the detachment point of the tranche and the at-
tachment point of the next senior tranche, the latter will absorb the re-
maining losses, up to its detachment point, and so on for the remaining
tranches. In this way, tranches that are more senior will only be aﬀected if
default losses reach their attachment point, after having wiped out all jun-
ior tranches.1
According to the model in Franke and Krahnen (2004), optimal securi-
tization design aims at a structure that facilitates funding of relationship-
speciﬁc assets by less informed (remote) investors. Senior tranches are
suited for these investors since, by construction, they are largely free of de-
fault risk; see Riddiough (1997) and DeMarzo (2005). Therefore, holders
of senior tranches are rarely exposed to the moral hazard component of 
the underlying lending relationships. Investors need not spend resources
on monitoring the underlying lending relationships, thus lowering the re-
quired tranche rate of return in equilibrium.2 Issuing mezzanine tranches
to relatively more sophisticated investors supports the reduction in delega-
tion costs even further. These investors have an expertise in risk assessment
and monitoring, providing a buﬀer between the ﬁrst-loss piece held by the
issuer and the senior piece held by remote investors.
The number of distinct mezzanine tranches should therefore depend on
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1. The strict seniority can be weakened by early amortization provisions. If, for example, a
AAA-tranche and a A-tranche get repaid annually, then the latter tranche may receive sub-
stantial repayments in the early years, which, in the end, may reduce the ﬁnal repayments on
the AAA-tranche.
2. See Ongena and Smith (2000) and Elsas and Krahnen (2004) for a review of relationship
lending and its role in a bank-oriented ﬁnancial system.the shape of the loss rate distribution. How does the number of tranches of
a given transaction relate to the degree of diversiﬁcation and the default
probability of the underlying loan portfolio? An empirical estimate follows
from regressing the number of tranches on Moody’s diversity score and on
the weighted average default probability:
No. of tranches   c    wadp    ds   u
In a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression using the same forty-
three European CLO transactions as before, we ﬁnd that the diversity score
has a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient (p   0.00), while wadp is insignif-
icant. The adjusted R-squared is 0.2. Thus, after controlling for the default
probability, a steeper loss rate distribution is associated with a higher num-
ber of mezzanine layers. Inclusion of the ﬁrst-loss piece and the issue date
do not change the regression results.
The implications of Franke and Krahnen (2004) relate to the risk allo-
cation achieved by tranching the underlying collateral portfolio. By ac-
quiring the senior tranche, remote investors essentially take on macroeco-
nomic risk. To be more precise, the payoﬀ from holding a senior tranche is
eﬀectively indexed to systemwide macroeconomic shocks. Deﬁne the
macrofactor of default risks as the average default rate on the aggregate
portfolio of debt claims. This factor is random and, by deﬁnition, ranges in
the [0,1] interval. Then a well-diversiﬁed loan portfolio of average initial
quality will only incur average default rates beyond, say, 10 percent if the
macrofactor is in the same range. Hence the senior tranches will only incur
default losses if the macrofactor turns out to be very bad.
This is not to say that in a similar situation there is no moral hazard of
the bank. It may well be that in a severe downturn situation banks do not
care much about their loans anymore. Moral hazard behavior may then be
diﬃcult to detect, so that reputational costs are low. Yet the senior tranches
are only impaired if the macrofactor turns out to be bad. If the macrofac-
tor turns out to be good, then even strong moral hazard behavior is very
unlikely to aﬀect the senior tranches at all.
Thus, the structural aspects characterizing collateralized debt obliga-
tions are devised to solve the inherent tension that exists between the orig-
inator, who has private information, and a diversiﬁed investor base with-
out this information. Due to the informational disparity, the originator’s
claim is highly illiquid, and a direct sale of the asset would create a large
discount relative to the going concern value of the asset; see Gorton and
Pennacchi (1995) and Diamond and Rajan (2001).
In section 13.2.3 we will characterize the properties of junior and senior
tranches, building on the information provided in the oﬀering circulars of 
a large number of European CDO-transactions. This characterization re-
quires knowledge of the loss rate distributions of the underlying portfolios,
in particular the allocation of default losses to the various tranches. Whether
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asymmetric information depends on the shape of the loss distribution.
13.2.2 Estimating the Loss Distribution
To estimate the loss distribution of the underlying portfolio and the im-
plied loss allocation to the various tranches, we proceed as follows. First,
we use the information in the oﬀering circular3 on the quality of the under-
lying loans and their initial portfolio weights, as indicated by a rating
agency. If this information is not available, we use the average initial loan
quality as indicated by a rating agency. Then we use Standard and Poor’s
(S&P) transition matrix for diﬀerent loan qualities to estimate the default
probabilities for particular loans over the lifetime of the transaction: we 
use Monte Carlo simulation to generate a distribution of rating migration
paths, assuming a 47.5 percent recovery rate throughout. Absent better
data on loss given default, these assumptions are standard in the literature.
Multiyear asset value migration tables are derived from the one-year
table through repeated multiplication. The migration matrix is then
mapped into a matrix of standard normal threshold values. For each asset,
a random draw from the standard normal distribution yields a migration
from the beginning of the year to the end of the year rating notch. To ar-
rive at a portfolio return, the correlations between loan migrations need to
be taken into account. This is done by a Cholesky transformation.
For assets in the same industry (in diﬀerent industries), the correlation
coeﬃcient is initially set at 0.3 (0.0), following common practice (Standard
& Poor’s 2002). Alterations of the assumptions on asset correlations will 
be used later on to analyze the impact of systematic risk on loss correla-
tions between tranches.
The generation of ﬁnal portfolio cash ﬂows and their allocation to the
tranches that constitute the issue is achieved in a last step. The cash ﬂows
of each period t are transformed in a realized ﬁnal (compound) value,
RFV t, using a ﬂat term structure of interest rates (4 percent). If a credit
event is recorded (default), then the assumed recovery is accounted for, and
all further cash ﬂows from this asset are set equal to zero. All ﬁnal cash
ﬂows are allocated to tranches according to the cashﬂow waterfall prin-
ciple, as deﬁned in the oﬀering circular. Finally, for each tranche, the nom-
inal claims of each period, NV t, are transformed into a ﬁnal value as well,
NFV t. The sum of these ﬁnal values over all tranches deﬁnes the ﬁnal value
of all claims. The ratio of these two ﬁnal values deﬁnes the portfolio loss
rate, PLRT  1 – Σt RFV t/Σt NFV t. Using 50,000 observations, a loss dis-
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3. Oﬀering Circulars (OC) are oﬃcial documents describing the issue’s collateral composi-
tion, among many other contractual and legal details of the arrangement. OCs are public in-
formation to be posted at the issue date. In addition, most issues are accompanied by presale
reports, published by rating agencies.tribution is generated that reﬂects the loss cascading inherent in the
tranche structure.4
Figure 13.1 shows the loss rate distribution of the London Wall 2002-2
transaction, issued by Deutsche Bank in 2002, which appears to be a typi-
cal example of a CDO-transaction. Here we assume an intraindustry cor-
relation of 0.3, and a zero interindustry correlation. The graph shows a
pronounced skewness. The expected loss is 150 bp (1.5 percent) with an
FLP of 246 bp. By retaining the FLP, the originator bears all losses within
the 91 percent-quantile of the loss rate distribution. Hence, a large fraction
of losses is not transferred to investors, which serves as a strong barrier to
adverse selection and moral hazard.
13.2.3 Loss Allocation in CDO Transactions
How is the risk of an underlying portfolio allocated to tranches? In par-
ticular, to what extent are losses, given the estimated probability distribu-
tion of loss rates, absorbed by the various tranches? In a typical issue, the
ﬁrst-loss piece comprises between 2 percent and 10 percent of the issue vol-
ume, while the senior AAA-rated tranche comprises as much as 80–95 per-
cent. Further evidence is derived from looking at a sample of forty Euro-
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4. There are a few simplifying assumptions: (1) there is no rating upgrade once an asset has
reached default status, (2) a defaulted asset immediately returns the recovery rate multiplied
by the nominal amount, and (3) every asset has a bullet structure—there is no prepayment.
Fig. 13.1 Loss rate distribution of London Wall 2002-2 transaction, 
50,000 iterations
Notes: This ﬁgure displays the loss rate distribution of London Wall, as it was simulated us-
ing the information contained in the oﬀering circular. A loss rate distribution for the entire
portfolio is generated that takes into account the correlation within and between industries
and the credit migration risks referencing Standard and Poor’s tables. The chart shows on the
vertical axis the frequency of observations, and on the horizontal axis the associated loss rate,
truncated at 13 percent. There was no observation surpassing this threshold.pean CDO-transactions with close to 150 tranches (see the list in table
13.1). This sample has some overlap with the CLO-sample used for the re-
gressions in section 13.2.1.
In calculating the loss distributions for this European CDO sample, we
rely on our own loss estimator, introduced in the last section. Given the loss
distribution, we then take the ratings of the tranches from the oﬀering cir-
cular and determine their attachment points. For this exercise we use S&P’s
table, which indicates the estimated default probability of a claim for a
given rating and a given maturity. This exercise starts with the most senior
tranche, and ends with the lowest-rated tranche. An AAA claim with ma-
turity of ten years, for example, has an estimated default probability of
about 1 percent. Then the attachment point of this tranche is the (100 – 1)-
percent quantile of the loss distribution. By the same procedure, the at-
tachment points of the other rated tranches are derived. The unrated ﬁrst-
loss piece is thus determined by the attachment point of the lowest-rated
tranche.
Table 13.2 summarizes the results of this mapping exercise.5 The table
presents average values by type of asset. We consider three asset classes:
collateralized loan obligations (CLO) with large loans and bonds, CLOs
with small corporate loans (SME-CLO), and the rest (other, including
CBOs and portfolios of CDO tranches). These asset classes diﬀer with re-
spect to diversiﬁcation and relationship intensity. First, the degree of di-
versiﬁcation is low for CBOs and high for SME-CLO issues, while CLOs
are somewhat in between, as evidenced by the average diversity scores. Sec-
ond, the relationship character of the underlying lending relationship is
probably highest in the case of the SME loans, and lowest in the case of
CBOs, which typically comprise bonds issued by large caps.
Table 13.2 uses a broad classiﬁcation of forty European transactions is-
sued between January 1999 and July 2002.6 It is instructive to compare the
second column with the fourth, SME-CLOs and CBOs, because the under-
lying assets diﬀer. The former consists of bank loans extended to small and
mid-sized companies, while the latter refers to bonds issued by large cor-
porates. The average quality of the loans is below that of the bonds. Not
only is the average issue size of SME portfolios about 80 percent higher
than that of the average CBO portfolio, but also the number of loans ex-
ceeds by far the number of bonds, suggesting that SME-CLOs are more
granular, that is, more diversiﬁed than CBOs. The table also shows that
while the average size of the ﬁrst-loss piece is similar for both issue types,7
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5. The size of the senior tranche reported in the last line of table 13.2 may therefore diﬀer
somewhat from the value reported in the oﬀering circulars. However, this method allows us
to estimate the loss quantiles allocated to tranches, an information not available in the oﬀer-
ing circulars.
6. All issues were selected for which we could get the oﬀering circular.
7. The size of the ﬁrst-loss piece is measured in percent of the underlying portfolio volume.Table 13.1 List of European CDO issues used for loss rate estimation
Volume No. of rated No. of  Average Dividend
Name CBO/CLO Maturity (bn €) tranches loans rating score
Dutch Care 2001-1 CLO 8 1.300 3 169 A1 12.4
Hesperic No. 1 pk CLO 6 1.400 5 104 Baa1 31
IKB Credit Linked Notes 2000-1 CLO 10 0.534 3 61 Ba2 33
Leverage Finance Europe 
Capital I.B.V. CLO 10 0.315 4 30 B1 26
London Wall 2002-1 PLC CLO 6 3.000 5 330 Baa2 70
London Wall 2002-2 PLC CLO 6 1.800 5 224 Baa2 70
ARCH ONE FINANCE 
LIMITED other 4 0.490 2 70 Baa1 47
ARGON CAPITAL PLC—
SERIES 1 other 7 1.382 5 53 Baa1 30
Brooklands Euro Ref. Linked 
Notes 2001-1 other 10 1.000 3 100 Baa1 50
Cathedral Limited other 5 0.466 3 52 Baa1/Baa2 36
CDO Master Investment 2 SA other 5 3.750 3 112 Baa1 66
CDO Master Investment 3 SA other 5 2.500 3 86 Baa1 60
CDO Master Investment SA other 5 1.625 3 100 Baa1 49
CIDNEO FINANCE Pk other 10 0.250 3 57 Baa2 34
CLASSIC FINANCE B.V. 
(Petra III) other 5 2.320 5 232 A3 103
Credico Funding S r.1 other 6 0.890 1 117 Ba1 30
Deutsche Bank—United 
Global Inv. Gr. CDO I other 5 1.436 3 148 Baa1 60
DYNASO 2002-1 LTD other 5 1.000 3 100 A3 55
Eirles Two Limited Series other 7 0.626 3 74 A3 40.8
European Dream 2001-1 other 7 1.069 3 59 Aa1 26
Helix Capital (Netherlands) 
B.V. 2001-1 other 5 0.800 2 80 A3 50
Lusitano Global CDO No. 1, Pk other 4 1.145 3 218 Baa3 35
Marche Asset Portfolio S r.1 other 3 0.168 3 59 Baa1 12
Redwood CBO other 10 0.300 3 100 B2 45
Spices Finance Limited Peas other 5 0.950 2 100 Baa2 56
Vintage Capital S.A. other 10 0.360 1 76 Baa2 36
CAST 1999-1 Ltd. SME CLO 7 2.900 4 4389 Baa3 70
CAST 2000-1 Ltd. SME CLO 7 4.500 4 1991 Baa3 70
CAST 2000-2 Ltd. SME CLO 7 2.500 4 5178 Baa3 95
HAT (Helvetic Asset Trust) AG SME CLO 5 2.500 3 650 Ba2 100
HAT (Helvetic Asset Trust) II
Limited SME CLO 5 2.500 4 1455 Ba2 110
PROMISE-A-2000-1 pk SME CLO 8 1.000 5 1097 Ba1 90
PROMISE-A-2002-1 pk SME CLO 8 1.618 6 1277 Ba1 124
Promise-C-2002-1 SME CLO 6 1.500 5 4578 Baa3 90
Promise-Color-2003-1 SME CLO 5 1.130 5 1512 Ba2 80
Promise-G-2001-1 SME CLO 7 0.650 4 100 Ba1 85
Promise-I-2000-1 SME CLO 8 2.500 5 2267 Baa3 80
Promise-I-2002-1 SME CLO 7 3.650 5 4172 Baa3 80
Promise-K-2001-1 SME CLO 5 1.000 5 2916 Ba1/Ba2 100
Promise-Z-2001-1 SME CLO 8 1.000 5 658 Ba1 85
Note: This table summarizes descriptive statistics of the issues that have been used to calculate the loss rate distribution
for the sample of European CDOs.it covers a much wider portion of the loss rate distribution in case of CBOs.
The size of their FLPs is on average 3.36 times the expected loss of the
underlying portfolio, and it is 1.34 times the loss in the case of SME-CLOs,
although the diﬀerence in rating quality of the underlying portfolios is
small. Due to the diﬀerence in FLPs, the median rating of the most junior-
rated tranche of the CBO transactions is several notches higher than its
counterpart among SME-CLO transactions. CBO ﬁrst-loss pieces cover
0.96 of the cumulative density of the underlying portfolio’s loss rate distri-
bution, on average. The remaining risk to be allocated to investors is rela-
tively small, allowing for only 2.85 additional tranches to be issued for
CBOs. This number is signiﬁcantly lower than in the case of SME-CLOs,
where it reaches 4.57.
In all asset classes, the ﬁrst-loss piece covers more than 100 percent of
the mean loss. Variations are sizeable, but there is no clear picture across
asset classes. The average size of the ﬁrst-loss piece is 7.1 percent, with a
signiﬁcant variation between non-SME-CLOs and CBOs. As a conse-
quence, FLPs take over most of the losses, and the losses allocated to the
senior tranche are restricted to extreme, systematic events. Their expected
value is very low—0.01 percent of the senior tranche volume, on average—
as is their default probability (0.5 percent).
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Table 13.2 Loss rate distribution of European CDOs: Descriptive statistics
SME-CLO Non-SME-CLO CBO
Total volume (bn euros) 2.068 1.392 1.126
No. of claims 2,303 153 100
Portfolio rating (median) Ba1 Baa2 Baa1
Most junior rated tranche (median) Ba2 Ba1 A3
Size FLP (%) 6.7 8.61 5.93
FLP/E(L) 1.34 1.74 3.36
FLP quantile (cdf) 0.87 0.87 0.96
Number of tranches 4.57 4.17 2.85
Size senior tranche (%) 91.11 87.79 92.89
Notes: This table summarizes basic characteristics of the CDO sample, with forty European
transactions used in the estimation of expected and unexpected loss. SME-CLOs are collat-
eralized loan obligations where underlyings comprise loans to small- and medium-size ﬁrms,
CBOs are collateralized bond obligations, with large ﬁrm corporate bonds as underlyings,
and non-SME-CLOs are a mixture of the two asset classes, comprising corporate bonds and
loans to large ﬁrms. The numbers in the table are averages across the transactions listed in the
column. Total volume is the amount, in bn euros, of the portfolio underlying the transaction,
and the number of tranches is the number of issued tranches, excluding the FLP. Size FLP is
the nominal value of a tranche relative to the nominal amount of the issue in fully funded and
synthetic transactions. Size senior tranche is the nominal value of the senior tranche relative
to the nominal amount of the issue. FLP/E(L) is the size of the FLP tranche relative to ex-
pected loss E(L) of the underlying portfolio. The FLP quantile is the cumulative density of
losses not exceeding the size of the ﬁrst-loss piece. All tranche-related statistics rely on our
own estimation of the loss rate distribution.13.2.4 Securitization Eﬀects on the Bank’s Overall Default Risk
Whereas the previous section analyzes the allocation of default losses to
diﬀerent tranches, this section looks at the impact of securitizations on the
bank’s overall default risk. This is also essential for the stock return anal-
ysis in section 13.3. Assuming a true sale, with all tranches being sold to
outside investors, except the ﬁrst-loss piece, what are the consequences for
the risk exposure of the bank? The answer depends on several aspects: ﬁrst,
what other assets does the bank have on its book and how are their cash
ﬂows and default risks correlated with those of the securitized loans? Sec-
ond, what would be the eﬀect of securitizing all default risks? Third, how
does securitization change the bank’s loan policy?
So far, there is little evidence on the impact of securitization on bank pol-
icy. Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) ﬁnd mixed evidence on whether banks’
risks increase with securitization. Regressing the banks’ return volatility
on securitization, they ﬁnd positive (insigniﬁcant) and negative (signiﬁ-
cant) coeﬃcients, depending on which other variables are included in the
regression.
In order to improve our understanding, we consider a bank with a port-
folio of ﬁfty identical loans extended equally to obligors in ﬁve diﬀerent in-
dustries, one year to maturity, and the same quality. The latter is set equal
to a B rating, implying a 8.5 percent default rate (Moody’s Investor Service
2002). The bank can either keep the loans in its books or securitize them.
For the securitized portfolio, the bank retains a nonrated tranche of 10.11
percent, that is, a ﬁrst-loss position. The bank then reinvests the proceeds,
amounting to (100 – 10.11) percent in new loans, to obligors with the same
quality characteristics as those in the initial loan book. Hence the on–bal-
ance sheet loan book of the bank, including the retained ﬁrst-loss piece,
has the same size as before securitization. But the new loans are not perfect
substitutes for the old loans because the new loans are granted to new
obligors, so that the granularity of the total loan portfolio increases.
This assumption of reinvestment represents a polar case of bank policy.
The other polar case would be that the bank reinvests the proceeds from se-
curitization in risk-free assets. In this case, the bank would retain the risks
of the ﬁrst-loss piece, but not incur new risks. For a highly rated bank, the
eﬀects would be very similar to those of an early repayment of debt. In re-
ality, banks are likely to follow some route between these polar cases, so
that some new risks are added to the bank’s portfolio.
Table 13.3 shows the ﬁrst four moments of the distribution of loss rates
(1) for the original loan portfolio without securitization and (2) for the new
portfolio, whose default losses are composed of those from the FLP of the
securitized portfolio plus all default losses from the newly granted loans.
The moments depend on the assumed intra- and interindustry correla-
tions; therefore, we report diﬀerent correlation scenarios. In the ﬁrst, the
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lation is zero. The other scenarios assume a stronger dependency, suggest-
ing the existence of a common systematic factor. Higher correlations re-
ﬂect a stronger macrofactor of default risks.
First, consider the eﬀect of securitization and reinvestment in the corre-
lation base case. Figure 13.2 plots the diﬀerence between the default rate
distribution of the new and that of the original portfolio. The graph indi-
cates that securitization and reinvestment lower the default probabilities in
the range of 0–18 percent, and raise them in the range of 18–46 percent.
Therefore, the mean loss rate of the new portfolio is higher than the re-
spective rate of the original portfolio. The ratio of the mean of the new
portfolio over that of the original portfolio is not just (1   [1 – 0.1011])  
1.8989, but clearly lower. The reason is that in the new portfolio the loss of
the securitized portfolio is restricted to the FLP.
More diﬃcult to grasp are the eﬀects on the second, third, and fourth
moments of the loss rate distribution. First, consider the standard devia-
tion. In table 13.3, the standard deviation of the new portfolio exceeds that
of the original portfolio. Intuitively, this is explained by scaling up losses
through securitization and reinvestment. But this is not true in general. Let
the par value of the original portfolio be 1$. If the bank securitizes this
portfolio, taking an FLP of 0.1$, it grants new loans for 0.9$. Let  op de-
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Table 13.3 Reinvestment of securitization proceeds: Simulation results for the loss
rate distributions
A. Assumptions regarding correlations
Within industries 0.3 0.5 0.7
Between industries 0.0 0.0 0.3
B. Moments
Original New Original New Original New 
portfolio portfolio portfolio portfolio portfolio portfolio
Mean (%) 5.67 10.51 5.70 10.30 5.64 9.52
Standard deviation (%) 3.52 5.43 4.29 6.61 7.63 11.26
Skewness 0.81 0.44 1.00 0.52 2.03 1.34
Excess kurtosis 0.68 –0.32 1.04 –0.46 4.76 1.13
Notes: This table summarizes the results of a simulation exercise. The original portfolio con-
sists of 50 B-rated loans of equal par value with one year to maturity, split evenly across ﬁve
industries. The new portfolio is obtained by securitizing the original portfolio, retaining a
ﬁrst-loss piece of 10.11 percent and reinvesting the par value of the original position minus
the ﬁrst-loss piece in another portfolio that has the same characteristics. The loss given de-
fault is assumed to be 52.5 percent. There are three scenarios in the table, which differ by their
correlation assumptions. The lower panel shows the ﬁrst four moments of the resulting loss
rate distribution for the bank’s loan book, including the retained ﬁrst-loss tranches, for the
three scenarios. The ﬁrst column (original portfolio) describes the loan book before securiti-
zation, the second (new portfolio) describes the loan book after the securitization transaction.note the standard deviation of the loss of the original portfolio,  FLP, the
standard deviation of the loss on the FLP, and  , the correlation coeﬃcient
between losses. Then the variance of the new portfolio equals
 2
FLP   2   1   0.9      op    FLP  0.92    2
op,
while the variance of the original portfolio equals  2
op. Obviously, the vari-
ance of the new portfolio is smallerthan that of the original portfolio if the
FLP is small relative to expected loss, so that it will be exhausted by losses
with high probability. In the limit,  FLPtends to zero, implying the variance
of the new portfolio roughly to equal 81 percent of the variance of the orig-
inal portfolio. Therefore it is not obvious whether the bank’s standard de-
viation of default losses will increase or decline through securitization and
reinvestment.
In table 13.3, skewness and excess kurtosis of the new portfolio decrease
relative to the original portfolio. From ﬁgure 13.2, this is not surprising, given
a shift of the probability mass from the lower tail to the center. This eﬀect
is more dramatic for the kurtosis than for the skewness, since the kurtosis
raises the diﬀerences to the mean to the fourth instead of the third power.
These eﬀects can also be seen by looking at the cumulative loss distribu-
tions in ﬁgure 13.3. These distributions show that the change in the loss
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Fig. 13.2 Securitization and reinvestment: Impact on loss rate distribution, 
10,000 iterations
Notes: This ﬁgure displays the diﬀerential loss rate distribution of a simulated loan portfolio
with securitization followed by reinvestment and without reinvestment. The original portfo-
lio consists of ﬁfty B-rated loans of equal par value with one year to maturity, split evenly
across ﬁve industries. The new portfolio is obtained by securitizing the original portfolio, re-
taining a ﬁrst-loss piece of 10.11 percent, and reinvesting the par value of the original posi-
tion, minus the ﬁrst-loss piece, in another portfolio that has the same characteristics. The loss
given default is assumed to be 52.5 percent. The pairwise within-industry correlations are 0.3,
while pairwise between-industry correlations are assumed to equal 0.0. The resulting diﬀer-
ential loss rate distribution is displayed in the ﬁgure.rate distribution caused by securitization and reinvestment is not merely a
shift, but also a spreading out of the distribution.
Second, we look at the eﬀects of correlations on these results. Of course,
correlations have no eﬀect on the average default rate of the original port-
folio. This is always the same (around 5.67 percent), even though the sim-
ulation produces slight diﬀerences. Figure 13.4 displays the diﬀerence
between two frequency distributions of default losses of the original port-
folio, the ﬁrst being determined by correlations (0.7; 0.3), the second by
(0.3; 0.0), with the ﬁrst number being the intraindustry correlation and the
second the interindustry correlation. Raising the correlations shifts prob-
ability mass from the range (6–24 percent) to both tails. Therefore, the
standard deviation, the skewness, and the excess kurtosis of the default rate
of the original portfolio increase with correlations.
More complex is the eﬀect of correlations on the default rate distribution
of the new portfolio. Figure 13.4 indicates that a FLP of about 10 percent
has to bear small losses (1–5 percent) with higher probabilities, and high
losses (6–10 percent) with lower probabilities. Hence, in this example,
higher correlations imply a lower average loss for the FLP. This also ex-
plains in table 13.3 why the ratio of average losses of the new over the orig-
inal portfolio declines with higher correlations.
Table 13.3 also indicates, for our example, that standard deviation and
skewness of the new portfolio increase with correlations, while this is not
always true of the kurtosis. The relative increase in standard deviation (new
over original portfolio) tends to slightly decline with higher correlations.
The relative changes in skewness and excess kurtosis do not display such
regular patterns. 
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Fig. 13.3 Securitization and reinvestment: Impact on cumulative loss distribution,
10,000 iterations
Notes: This ﬁgure displays the cumulative loss rate distributions of a simulated loan portfolio
with securitization and reinvestment (new) and without reinvestment (original). The same
data as in ﬁgure 13.2 are used.The simulation exercise begs the question whether securitization and
reinvestment will have an impact on the systematic risk of the bank, as
measured by the sensitivity of the bank’s default losses to a macrofactor of
default losses. If the bank retains the ﬁrst-loss piece and reinvests the pro-
ceeds from securitization in loans to new obligors, then tranching and rein-
vestment raise the granularity of the total loan book, which in turn raises
the bank’s systematic cash ﬂow risk. As a result, the bank’s stock market
beta may be aﬀected as well. We will look into this matter in the next sec-
tion.
13.3 Share Price Reactions to the Issue of Collateralized Debt Obligations
In this section we want to analyze how the securitization of loan assets
aﬀects the equity valuation of the bank. In accordance with the last sec-
tion, emphasis will be on eﬀects that are due to tranching and reinvest-
ment. Earlier studies, including the event studies (Lockwood, Rutherford,
and Herrera 1996, and Thomas 2001), have neglected the important risk-
repackaging aspect of loan securitization.
13.3.1 Hypotheses and Test Design
Our main hypothesis relates the eﬀects of securitization to the systematic
stock market risk of the bank as measured by its beta. The change in beta
depends on the change in the standard deviation of the bank’s stock return
and the change in the correlation between the bank’s stock return and the
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Fig. 13.4 Increase in correlation and loss rate distribution, 10,000 iterations
Notes: This ﬁgure displays the diﬀerential loss rate distribution of a simulated loan portfolio
with a low and a high level of correlation. In the underlying collateral portfolios there are 100
assets each, all BB rated, two industries, the pairwise within-industry correlations increase
from 0.3 to 0.7, while pairwise between-industry correlations increase from 0.0 to 0.3. The re-
sulting diﬀerential loss rate distribution is displayed in the ﬁgure.market return. In order to derive hypotheses about these changes, we as-
sume, ﬁrst, that a higher standard deviation of the default losses incurred
by the bank translates into a higher standard deviation of its stock return.
Second, we assume that an increase in the granularity of the bank’s loan
portfolio translates into a higher correlation between the bank’s stock re-
turn and the market return. This is motivated by the empirical observation
that the credit spread of a corporate bond is negatively related to the cor-
poration’s stock return (see, for example, Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh
2005, and Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin 2001). Hence the mar-
ket value of a loan portfolio should be positively correlated with the mar-
ket value of a portfolio of the stocks of the underlying corporations, which,
in turn, are positively correlated with the market return. The more granu-
lar the loan portfolio, the better diversiﬁed it will be, and the stronger
should be the correlation of its market value with the market return. Given
the immediate impact of the market value of the bank’s loan portfolio on
its own market value, a more granular loan portfolio should translate into
a higher correlation between the bank’s stock return and the market return.
In the following we consider a bank that in a securitization retains the
ﬁrst-loss piece and sells or swaps the other tranches to investors. As shown
before, the securitization impact on the bank’s risk depends strongly on the
bank’s reinvestment policy. We consider again the two polar cases dis-
cussed before.
If the bank securitizes the loan portfolio in a true sale transaction, but
takes no new risks, then the standard deviation of the bank’s default losses
should decline, because the bad tail risks of the loss distribution are trans-
ferred to investors. This is likely to reduce the standard deviation of the
bank’s stock return, holding the liability side of its balance sheet constant.
Similarly, if the bank repays some of its debt, holding the equity capital
constant, then this should also reduce the standard deviation of the bank’s
stock return. Regarding the correlation between the bank’s stock return
and the market return, we expect a slight decline, because the transfer of
the bad tail risks to investors immunizes the bank to very bad outcomes of
macro factors. Hence, overall we expect a slight decline of the bank’s beta
after a securitization, given a risk-free reinvestment policy.
Now consider the other polar case, in which the bank reinvests the pro-
ceeds from securitization in new loans of comparable quality. As shown be-
fore, the standard deviation of the bank’s default losses is likely to increase,
which should also raise the standard deviation of the bank’s stock return.
Since the reinvestment raises the granularity of the bank’s loan portfolio,
this should raise the correlation between the bank’s stock return and the
market return. Therefore, given this reinvestment policy, the bank’s beta
should increase. This eﬀect should be stronger for banks that engage in
repeated securitizations and thus, over time, increase the share of equity
tranches among its assets. This motivates our ﬁrst hypothesis.
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proceeds of the securitization are reinvested in new loans to new obligors
(risk-free assets). The eﬀect will be stronger for repeated CDO-transactions.
Hypothesis 1 addresses the two polar cases. Banks may well choose poli-
cies in between. Since we do not have detailed data on the banks’ behav-
ior, we cannot ﬁnd out what they actually do. We can only try to ﬁnd out
whether the banks’ betas increase or not. This is, at best, indirect evidence
of the banks’ policies. A more rigorous test would use ﬁgures from their
quarterly reports. Even using such ﬁgures, it would be diﬃcult to separate
investment and capital structure decisions associated with securitizations
from other decisions.
Similarly, one might argue that we should look at the banks’ unlevered
betas; that is, the beta deﬁned by the joint stock and bond return of the
bank and that of the market. This would require daily data on the bank’s
debt, a large part of which is not securitized. Since we do not have these
data, we look at conventional betas. Given the small size of issues, 1.3 per-
cent of the balance sheet on average (see table 13.4), the relative eﬀects on
equity beta and on asset beta are likely to be quite similar.
Hypothesis 1 refers to beta changes at the time securitizations are an-
nounced, presuming that such announcements are a surprise. In some
countries, especially the United States, some banks engage in securitiza-
tion programs. Although the timing of individual securitizations in a pro-
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Table 13.4 European collateralized debt obligation (CDO) dataset: Descriptive statistics
Number Size (collateral  Number of Share of balance  Equity (book
Year of issues assets, € bn) tranches sheet assets (%) value, € bn)
A. European dataset (n = 73)
1999 10 1.682 6.40 0.54 12.531
2000 17 2.586 5.53 1.42 11.725
2001 20 2.629 5.60 2.08 14.692
2002 26 1.940 6.30 0.95 15.048
B. Subsample of nonrepeat issues (n = 51)
1999 7 1.674 5.43 0.66 10.341
2000 14 2.640 5.36 1.52 10.758
2001 15 2.850 5.67 2.66 12.440
2002 15 1.912 6.60 1.48 9.617
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics of the CDO data set. The numbers (except no. of issues)
are averages across transactions. Panel A uses information on seventy-three issues underlying the esti-
mations in section 13.3, collected from Datastream. Panel B represents a subsample of ﬁfty-one, com-
prising only those issues that did not experience a repeat issue by the same issuer within ﬁve months af-
ter the ﬁrst transaction. “Size” is the euro volume of collateral assets underlying the issue. “Number of
tranches” is taken from the offering circulars. All tranches, including nonrated tranches, are considered.
“Share of balance sheet assets” divides size by total assets of the bank. “Equity (book value)” is the is-
suing bank’s sum of equity and open reserves, according to Datastream.gram may not be perfectly anticipated by the market, the long-run eﬀects
on bank cash ﬂows may be anticipated rather well, in which case we would
expect little eﬀect of announcements of individual securitizations. But at
least during our sample period, European banks did not announce pro-
grams, apart from mortgage-backed master trust securitizations, which are
absent from our data. Thus, the number, size, and timing of securitizations
by European banks are diﬃcult to predict. To the extent that the market is
nevertheless able to make predictions, it would tend to weaken our ability
to ﬁnd any impact of securitization on returns and betas.
We now turn to the stock price reaction triggered by the announcement
of the securitization, as captured by the abnormal return in a typical event
study. The abnormal return is determined by the expectation of investors,
given the information contained in the issue announcement.8If stockhold-
ers interpret the securitization as a pure change in the bank’s ﬁnancing
strategy, then in a perfect market there should be no stock price eﬀect, un-
less the change in the ﬁnancing strategy redistributes wealth from the
stockholders to the bondholders, or vice versa. Since the stockholders hold
the equity piece and the bondholders hold the senior tranche of the bank’s
assets, securitization without risky reinvestment should typically reduce
the expected default losses of the bank’s bondholders and, thus, enrich
them at the expense of the stockholders. This would argue in favor of a neg-
ative stock price reaction. Securitization with risky reinvestment might
have the opposite eﬀect.
Similarly, if the bank uses a true sale transaction to obtain new funding,
then stockholders may interpret the transaction as unfavorable informa-
tion about the bank’s funding needs and react by a stock price decline.
This, however, would not be true for a synthetic transaction, because then
the bank does not receive funding. Finally, the transaction cost of securiti-
zation is nonnegligible, adding to a negative stock price impact.
On the other side, securitization enables the bank to expand its loan or
other business. This may be considered by the stockholders as a valuable
real option of the bank, so that the stock price should increase. Similarly,
to the extent that securitization protects the bank against major default
losses, it may reduce the costs of ﬁnancial distress. This would also be good
news for the stockholders.
Summarizing, the net impact of securitization on the bank’s stock price
is hard to predict. It is an empirical matter as to which eﬀects dominate.
Across the entire sample, we do not expect to ﬁnd signiﬁcant stock price
reactions to the announcement of securitizations.
We will provide evidence, ﬁrst, by looking at all transactions, and sec-
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8. From conversations with practitioners we know that the valuation of CDO mezzanine
tranches is typically preceded by a bookbuilding period resembling an English auction, as
modeled in Plantin (2003).ond, by looking at diﬀerent subsets of transactions to ﬁnd out whether the
hypothesis holds equally well for all these subsets.
There are a number of characteristics that may be cross-sectionally rele-
vant. Among these characteristics is the synthetic nature of a deal, because
synthetic deals eliminate the funding component in an issue and, therefore,
synthetic issues should have a smaller impact on the bank’s asset composi-
tion, relative to a fully funded transaction.
A second characteristic of securitization transactions that may be rele-
vant for cross-sectional diﬀerences is the nature of the issue as static or dy-
namic. Static issues maintain the original asset composition of the collat-
eral portfolio throughout the life of the transaction. This typically implies a
gradual redemption of the outstanding issue, in accordance with repayment
of the underlying loans. Dynamic issues, in contrast, tend to maintain their
original volume throughout the entire term of the issue. If loans in the col-
lateral portfolio are redeemed, the issuer replaces them by new loans, safe-
guarding certain quality standards. While replenishment standards vary be-
tween issues, a general implication is that banks are required to assign new
loans to the collateral portfolio in a systematic, nonrandom manner.
Since both properties—synthetic/true sale and static/dynamic—exert
an inﬂuence on the asset composition of the bank, we expect both charac-
teristics to be consequential for the value eﬀect of the issue announcement.
13.3.2 Data and Results of the Event Study
In compiling our data set we initially looked at all transactions in
Moody’s European Securitization list of June 2003. The number of issues
is 254, of which 185 have a Moody’s “New Issue Report.” It is this report
that contains the information required for conducting the study, including
a description of the underlying assets as well as the covenants relevant for
the issue. Among the many other features of the issue, the report also con-
tains the pricing of the tranches at the issue date and the name of the orig-
inator. Not every issue has a single originator.9
For 112 transactions we were able to identify the originator. We imposed
the additional restriction that the originator is a listed company (else no
stock price is available), and arrive at a sample of ninety-two transactions
from thirty-one banks. We excluded the non-European banks, and ﬁnally
have seventy-three transactions issued by twenty-seven banks. These issues
are used for the event study and, later on, for the cross-sectional analysis.
Table 13.4 presents the descriptives of our ﬁnal dataset. In the upper
panel of table 13.4 one can see that the average size of transactions is small
relative to the entire balance sheet, up to 2 percent of total assets. For re-
peat issuers this share of balance sheet assets adds up to 5–10 percent of
Default Risk Sharing between Banks and Markets 623
9. Several ABS products are managed arbitrage deals that pass through the cash ﬂows of
several originators at once.total assets, and in some cases an even larger share of the total loan book.
The average number of tranches over all transactions is about six. The
lower panel refers to a subsample of the seventy-three issues, comprising
ﬁfty-one issues. It excludes repeat issues, that is, all transactions whose is-
sue date is less than ﬁve months (100 days) after another issue by the same
bank. This subsample will also be used later in the regression analysis. The
basic model is an augmented event study estimation.
Ri,t    i    iRm,t    1,iDi
event    2,iDi
otherevent   i
 Di
afterRm,t   εi,t;
t    20, . . . ,  20
The dependent variable Ri,t, as well as the independent variable Rm,t, are
daily log returns, the ﬁrst being the bank’s stock return, the latter being de-
ﬁned by the Dow Jones EUROSTOXX 50 index.10 The dummy Devent cap-
tures the abnormal return over the event window. The window extends
from day –20 to day  20 around the announcement date. Announcement
dates were assumed to be the ﬁrst public notiﬁcation that could be identi-
ﬁed in Lexis-Nexis, or in presale reports of the three major agencies.
The estimation uses a 200-days window, symmetrically around the event
window. Thus for each event the time series extends over 240 trading
days—approximately one year. Since we are interested in a possible change
of systematic risk, the regression has a second variable capturing system-
atic risk, delta-beta (  ), which is multiplied by a dummy, Dafter, which
equals 1 for the 100 days following the event window (–20,  20). The co-
eﬃcient   measures the extent to which the after-event beta diverges from
its preevent value. The null hypothesis sets    at zero.
The estimation is complicated by the fact that for many cases in our
sample there are repeat issuers, and the interval between two consecutive
announcement dates by the same issuer is frequently less than 100 days.
Since a separate regression is run for every transaction, there is overlap
among the estimation windows. In order to disentangle the eﬀect of the
original event from the eﬀects of other events, we include a dummy “other
event,” Dotherevent, whose coeﬃcient captures abnormal returns in a –20/ 20
days window around each other event.
To deal with    in these frequent issue cases, we set the dummy Dafter
equal to 2 (3) for the second (third) subsequent overlapping event. Thus, we
force    to be of the same order of magnitude for all successive and over-
lapping events.
In order to account for contemporaneous correlations between the re-
gressors, we employ the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method-
ology. Contemporaneous correlation between regressors is to be expected,
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10. We also ran the regressions with excess returns, rather than returns, and found the same
results.since we observe some clustering of the event dates (see ﬁgure 13.5). The re-
gression system is run in calendar time rather than in event time, so that
contemporaneous correlations are properly accounted for.11 To check the
robustness of our results, the regressions were also run in event time, and
as OLS regressions. All estimations yield qualitatively the same results.
The regression results are presented in table 13.5. While regression A.1
covers all seventy-three events, regression A.2 uses only the ﬁfty-one events
without overlap. Clearly, the announcement of a securitization does not
generate abnormal stock returns. In regression A.1, the average values of
the coeﬃcients    1 and    2 are very close to zero and insigniﬁcant. In regres-
sion A.2,    1 is higher but still insigniﬁcant. Thus, our conjecture that the
announcement of securitizations does not yield signiﬁcant abnormal re-
turns is conﬁrmed.
Securitization has, however, a rather impressive eﬀect on the banks’ av-
erage beta. Even though the relative increase in beta is rather modest, this
is to be expected, given the small size of most securitizations relative to
bank size. In regression A.1, beta increases in the postsecuritization period
by 0.05, as shown by the coeﬃcient of   . The coeﬃcient is highly signiﬁ-
cant. This ﬁnding suggests that many banks engaged in securitizations in-
crease their exposure vis-à-vis the market return. Our data, however, do
not allow us to infer the sources of this increase in systematic risk.
In regression A.2, we look at the subsample of securitization events
without overlap. Now the coeﬃcient of   turns out to be much lower; also,
the signiﬁcance level is much lower. This sample underrepresents repeat is-
suers, that is, the large issuers. Thus, the beta increase after securitizations
is much stronger for repeat issuers. These are more likely to systematically
increase their risk after securitization.
The surprisingly strong increase in beta raises the question whether this
ﬁnding may be biased. In particular, it is possible that the beta of the bank-
Default Risk Sharing between Banks and Markets 625
11. With 73   241 observations, there are enough degrees of freedom to estimate all coeﬃ-
cients in the SUR system. The regressions were also run in event time, without having a ma-
terial eﬀect. In fact, the results are even numerically very close.
Fig. 13.5 Time series of announcement dates
Note: This ﬁgure plots the seventy-three announcement dates between January 1999 and
September 2002.ing industry increased over the sampling period and this eﬀect accounted
for the observed securitization impact on beta. In order to check for this
possibility, we also estimated an augmented model
Ri,t    i    iRm,t    1,iDi
event    2,iDi
otherevent    i
 Di
afterRm,t    i(Rb,t   Rm,t) 
   i
 Di
after(Rb,t   Rm,t)   εi,t
t    20, . . . ,  20
This regression includes as an additional regressor the excess bank index
return Rb—Rm, deﬁned as the log return of the European bank stock index
minus the log market return.
In the augmented model, as shown in regression A.3 in table 13.5, the
sensitivity of the single bank stock return with respect to the market return
over the whole event window—the traditional beta—is now 0.82, whereas
it is 0.68 for the excess bank index return.12Looking at the changes of these
sensitivities after securitization, the traditional beta increases by a signiﬁ-
cant 0.062—essentially unchanged from regression A.1—whereas the sen-
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12. Thus the market sensitivity increases from 0.74 (in regression A.1) to 0.82 (in A.3), due
to the addition of the excess bank return index. The net sensitivity with regard to the market
is 0.14, while it is 0.68 for the excess bank index.
Table 13.5 Announcement effects: Regression results
Ri,t =  i +  iRm,t +  1,iDevent +  2,iDother event +   
i DafterRm,t +  i(Rb,t – Rm,t) +   
i Dafter (Rb,t – Rm,t) + εi,t
     1  2        
A.1 (n = 73) –0.0003 0.7413 –0.0003 0.0003 0.05097
w/ repeat issues (0.982) (0.000) (0.360) (0.456) (0.003)
A.2 (n = 51) –0.0003 0.6597 0.0165 0.00175
w/o repeat issues (0.943) (0.055) (0.343) (0.094)
A.3 (n = 73) 0.0002 0.8230 –0.004 0.003 0.062 0.684 0.137
w/ repeat issues (0.894) (0.000) (0.289) (0.773) (0.021) (0.000) (0.007)
Notes: This table reports the results of the event study relating to the announcement of collateralized
debt obligation (CDO) issues. A calendar time seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimation of the
determinants of issue banks’ excess stock returns was employed. The ﬁrst and third regression (A.1 and
A.3) are time series estimations with seventy-three events over a window of 241 trading days. The sec-
ond regression (A.2) has ﬁfty-one events, excluding overlapping events by the same issuer (i.e., repeat
issues). All regressions use data from the period January 1999 to December 2002. The dependent vari-
able in all regressions is Ri,t, the daily log return of twenty-seven banks (from Datastream). The ex-
planatory variables are Rm,t, Rb,t, Devent, Dother event, and Dafter. Rm,t is the log return on the DJ EuroStoxx 
and Rb,t is the log return on the DJ Euro STOXX Bank. Both indexes are taken from Datastream. Devent
equals one for the event window (–20, +20), where the event is the announcement date of the CDO is-
sue, Dother event equals one for all other event windows in the period (–120, +120), and Dafter equals one for
the period (+20, +120). If there is more than one other event, the dummy D-after is equal to 2 (3) for the
second (third) subsequent overlapping event. Wald-statistics (p-values) are in parentheses.sitivity with respect to the excess bank index return increases by 0.14,
which is highly signiﬁcant. Hence, taking both increases together, they are
even more impressive than in the one-index model, A.1. This indicates
again that on average the banks engaging in securitizations expand their
risk taking.13 Therefore, the increase in the traditional beta shown in re-
gression A.1 does not appear to be driven by changes in the beta of the
bank index return.
Given the increase of the traditional beta after securitization (regression
A.1), we next ask whether this increase diﬀers across types of transactions.
For that purpose, we regress the bank-speciﬁc increases of  i
 , as estimated
in regression A.1, on a set of transaction-speciﬁc characteristics. The esti-
mated model is:
 i
       1Di
dynamic    2Di
synthetic    3Di
CLO    4Di
CBO    5Di
other
   6 8Di
year   εi
The explanatory variables generate partitions of the sample. In particu-
lar, Ddynamic is a dummy variable that equals 1 for managed issues; that is,
collateral portfolios that are being replenished over the life of the issue.
Dsynthetic separates between synthetic and fully funded true sale issues,
where the dummy equals 1 for synthetic issues. DCLO, DCBO, and Dother sub-
divide the sample into four categories according to the type of the under-
lying asset portfolio, as loans, bonds, mortgages (the reference group), and
all others (e.g., credit card or leasing claims). The Dyear dummies stand for
the issue years, with 2002 as the reference year.
The cross-sectional analysis of   , reported in table 13.6, oﬀers addi-
tional insight into what drives the increase in beta after securitizations.
Among the structural characteristics, the dummy for managed issues,  1, is
the only one that turns out to be signiﬁcant. Since its sign is negative, it sig-
niﬁes that managed issues have a lower increase in systematic risk; that is,
the bank may be less motivated to increase granularity in the aftermath of
a securitization, or the bank may be more concerned to restrict the new
risks to avoid early termination of the transaction, relative to static deals.
The variables representing the type of underlying asset, such as CLOs or
CBOs, remain insigniﬁcant altogether.
Clearly, these ﬁndings are explorative in nature, and they will have to be
followed up by an integration of structural data concerning the collateral
assets as well as balance sheet details of the bank.
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13. We also employed alternative speciﬁcations of the banking industry model, using Rb as
a regressor, rather than the diﬀerence of (Rb – Rm), and using the error term from a ﬁrst stage
regression that relates Rb to Rm. All speciﬁcations lead to the same qualitative results. Fur-
thermore, we also ran the regression in event time, and as a set of OLS-regressions, with very
similar results for all speciﬁcations.13.4 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the design of CDO-transactions and their
impact on the default risk exposure of the originating bank. These risk
eﬀects are measured in two diﬀerent ways: the impact on the bank’s default
losses and on its stock beta. The latter reﬂects the impact on the systematic
risk in the stock market. Adverse selection and moral hazard problems,
which are considered strong barriers to trading-default risks, are largely
eliminated in a CDO-transaction by a substantial FLP of the originator.
The size of this position increases with the average default probability of
the underlying portfolio. Typically, only a small portion of default losses of
the underlying portfolio is transferred in a CDO-transaction. In addition
to the ﬁrst-loss piece, tranching typically leads to a large senior tranche,
which in the case of a fully funded transaction may be sold to investors so
that the originator is protected against high default losses that otherwise
might lead to ﬁnancial distress.
The bank can adjust its policy to securitization in diﬀerent ways. In one
polar case it does not take new risks, in the other polar case it strongly ex-
pands its risk taking. The impact of securitization and reinvestment on the
banks’ default risk is illustrated in a simulation exercise that also illustrates
the impact of default correlations on the bank’s risk exposure. If the bank
uses the securitization proceeds to expand its loan business, then its de-
fault risk tends to increase. This tends to translate also into an increase 
in its stock beta. On average, a beta increase is conﬁrmed by our empirical
ﬁndings. Our evidence suggests that many banks use the risk reduc-
tion achieved through securitization to take new risks. However, this ﬁnding
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Table 13.6 Announcement effects: Second-stage regression results
  
i = α + λ1 · Di
dyn + λ2 · Di
syn + λ3 · Di
CLO + λ4 · Di
CBO + λ5 · Di
other + λ6 · Di
99 + λ7 · Di
00 + λ8 · Di
01 + εi
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8
0.061 –0.165 0.129 0.006 –0.111 –0.057 –0.282 0.172 –0.017
(0.65) (0.02) (0.16) (0.95) (0.45) (0.62) (0.01) (0.04) (0.83)
Adj. R2 0.235
Notes: This table reports the results of the event study relating to the announcement of CDO issues. A
SUR estimation of the determinants of excess stock returns of the issuing banks was employed. The re-
gression in this table is a cross-sectional estimation of the determinants of delta-beta from the regression
A.1 in table 13.5, i.e. the change in systematic risk after an event. The explanatory variables are Ddyn, Dsyn,
DCLO, DCBO, Dother, D99, D00, D01. Ddyn equals one for a managed issue, Dsynequals one for a synthetic issue.
DCLO, DCBO, and Dother equal one when the collateral portfolio consists of loans, bonds, or other assets.
Mortgage backed securities are the reference group. D99, D00, and D01 equal one for the issue year 1999,
2000, or 2001; p-values are in parentheses. As in table 13.5, the estimation is with seventy-three events
over a window of 241 trading days. The regression uses data from the period January 1999 to December
2002.has to be interpreted with care, given the size of the dataset and the length
of the observation period.
Finally, we tentatively draw some conclusions about consequences of se-
curitizations for ﬁnancial markets. The risk transfer achieved by securiti-
zation depends as much on the way the issue is tranched as on the alloca-
tion of these tranches to diﬀerent groups of investors. The tranching
technique allows us to largely separate idiosyncratic risks from macro de-
fault risks. Assuming that the default risk of corporate loans depends on
the relationship between the bank and its customers, tranching allows to
allocate information-sensitive risks predominantly to the ﬁrst-loss piece,
and to a lesser extent to the mezzanine pieces, while the large senior
tranches are largely free of these risks. In turn, extreme macro risks are
borne predominantly by the senior tranches. The return on these tranches
is eﬀectively indexed to systemwide economic shocks. To the extent that
loan securitizations replace the traditional “risk-free” deposit-ﬁnancing 
of banks, one may conclude that both—bank lending and funding—are
indexed to macro risks, making the banks less vulnerable.
To what extent these eﬀects exist depends on the allocation of tranches
to diﬀerent types of investors. To realize an optimal risk sharing, the ﬁrst-
loss piece should be retained by the originating bank, because then its in-
centives as a lender are kept intact. In contrast, senior tranches should be
allocated to remote investors, in order to improve the stability of ﬁnancial
markets. Remote investors are deﬁned as investors who are in a better po-
sition to withstand macro shocks, so that their solvency is not endangered.
In contrast, highly levered ﬁnancial intermediaries without any hedge
against macro shocks would be endangered, and the domino eﬀects of
insolvencies might destabilize the ﬁnancial system. Figures published by
banks and bank regulators indicate that ﬁnancial intermediaries them-
selves buy the bulk of CDO tranches. It appears that originating banks of-
ten retain the nonsecuritized senior portion in synthetic deals. This indi-
cates that the banking system as a whole is not eﬀectively hedged against
macro shocks. Financial stability would be improved if banks would nei-
ther invest in the senior tranches nor retain them, but sell them to more re-
mote investors.
These tentative conclusions suggest a demand for more research along
the lines we have presented in this paper. On the modeling side, the corre-
lation structure between tranches of diﬀerent seniority is relevant for
CDO-bond portfolio management and for assessing ﬁnancial system sta-
bility. For example, a change in the correlation between asset classes not
only alters the default probabilities of tranches, but also the joint default
probabilities of diﬀerent tranches. The latter statistic is relevant for the
analysis of contagion eﬀects, as pointed out by Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz
(2003) and Gersbach (2002). On the empirical side, more research is
needed to ﬁnd out how banks change their business policy in response to
Default Risk Sharing between Banks and Markets 629securitization. In addition, more evidence is required on the eﬀective allo-
cation of tranches to investor groups and on the expanded role of com-
mercial banks as intermediaries between capital markets and the corporate
sector, as discussed in Gorton and Pennacchi (1995). It appears that the se-
curitization of bank loans provides an eﬃcient new tool to combine the ad-
vantages of bank- and market-based ﬁnancial systems.
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Comment Patricia Jackson
Franke and Krahnen consider the question of the eﬀect on banks’ risk pro-
ﬁles of the securitization of a portion of their assets through the collateral-
ized debt obligation (CDO) market. The CDO market has grown rapidly
over the past ﬁve years, and new issuance worldwide has probably reached
some £100bn per annum; therefore, the question the authors pose is im-
portant.
Through a CDO the bank transfers some default risk on loans it has
originated to the holders of securities while retaining part of the risk itself.
The securitization is usually structured so that the ﬁrst portion of any loss
is covered by the originating bank. Franke and Krahnen ﬁnd that the
banks retain a sizeable portion of default risk, leaving the market with the
tail risk—the risk of extreme events. In eﬀect, the banks are retaining the
risk portion that is easier to price into the original loan through the mar-
gin (the expected loss) plus some of the unexpected loss relating to more
probable events, which is also easier to measure.
Franke and Krahnen estimate a loss distribution for diﬀerent types of
securitization pools and compare these with the size of the ﬁrst-loss piece
retained by the banks. The method used is to take information on the qual-
ity of the underlying loans as indicated by a rating agency and then use an
S&P rating transition matrix to estimate the loss distribution. They assume
a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.3 for assets in the same industry.
They ﬁnd that in a typical issue the ﬁrst loss piece is between 2 percent
and 10 percent of the issue volume. In the case of collateralized bond obli-
gations (CBOs), where the securities are collateralized by bonds, the ﬁrst-
loss piece is on average 3.36 times the expected loss on the underlying port-
folio, versus 1.34 times in the case of collateralized loan obligations (CLOs)
collateralized by loans to small- to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The
diﬀerence could in part reﬂect the fact that the distribution of losses on
Default Risk Sharing between Banks and Markets 631SME portfolios may be tighter, with many more losses falling closer to the
mean—because small companies fail in all points of the cycle, whereas
failures of large companies are concentrated in recessions. The correla-
tions may therefore be larger for bonds and large company loans than
SMEs. However, the fact that the most junior-rated tranche of the CBO
transactions is rated several notches higher than those in the SMEs does
support the Franke and Krahnen view that, to a degree, the banks are ab-
sorbing less risk in the case of SME transactions.
The most important question tackled is the eﬀect that securitization has
on the overall risk proﬁle of the sponsoring banks. Franke and Krahnen fo-
cus on various assumptions concerning the reinvestment of the funds
raised from the securitization, assuming that the bank can reinvest the pro-
ceeds less the ﬁrst-loss position (FLP). They ﬁnd that the mean loss rate of
the new portfolio (including the FLP in the securitization and the risk in
the portfolio gained by reinvesting the funds from the securitization) is
higher. But the skewness and kurtosis are lower, underling the point that
securitization is enabling the banks to move extreme scenario risk into the
market. Again, the banks are keeping the portion of risk for which it is eas-
iest to price/set aside reserves and moving the rest into the market.
This would appear to reduce the risks of the banks and the banking sec-
tor. Banking crises generally occur when the sector is under overall pres-
sure because of a severe macroeconomic downturn. But one important
question beyond the scope of this paper is the extent to which banks might
feel obligated to help support the securitization market, eﬀectively moving
the losses back onto the balance sheet.
Franke and Krahnen also point to evidence that much of the market in
higher-rated tranches consists of sales to other banks. Thus, much of the
extreme risk is not moving out of the banking sector. The eﬀect on indi-
vidual banks will, however, depend on the overall proﬁle of their existing
book.
To see the overall eﬀect on the riskiness of banks carrying out the secu-
ritization it would also be necessary to consider the eﬀect on risk relative
to the capital held by the banks and also relative to the margin/provisions
to cover expected losses. Under the current Basel Accord FLPs held by
banks are deducted from capital; under Basel II, all tranches rated below
BB will also be deducted. In eﬀect, such risky tranches are treated as ex-
pected loss, which has to be covered dollar for dollar by capital. The mar-
ket sets the total amount of capital required by a major internationally ac-
tive bank, because more capital is needed than the Basel minimum to
achieve an adequate rating, but the market probably relies to a degree on
the Basel measurement approach and looks for an excess above it. In addi-
tion, rating agencies will be very aware of the amount and type of securiti-
zations being carried out by individual banks. A bank might therefore be
unable to reinvest as large a proportion of the receipts from securitization
632 Günter Franke and Jan Pieter Krahnenas is assumed in this paper, given the capital needed to back the ﬁrst loss in
the securitization, unless more capital is raised.
Franke and Krahnen use event studies to consider the market reaction
to the announcement of securitizations, while acknowledging that the net
impact of securitization on a bank’s stock price is hard to predict. In addi-
tion to the factors mentioned in the paper, the size of the program relative
to the bank’s balance sheet would be important, as well as the likely eﬀect
on bank earnings. They ﬁnd that securitization does not generate abnor-
mal stock returns but it does increase the bank’s beta. It is not fully clear
why this is the case.
Discussion Summary
The general discussion focused on technical suggestions for the authors.
Gary Gorton suggested that synthetic CLOs should be removed from the
sample, as they have no eﬀect on the leverage of the sponsor. Til Schuer-
mann suggested that the authors focus on expected shortfall measures of
loss in their modeling of individual securitizations. Philippe Jorion and
Hashem Pesaran expressed concern about cross-sectional dependence in
the pooled sample of CLOs, suggesting that diﬀerent methods may be
needed in estimation of standard errors. Mark Carey suggested that unlev-
ered rather than levered betas be used in the computations.
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